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ABSTRACT  
Standing in San Marco Cathedral in Venice, you immediately notice the exquisitely 
decorated spandrels: the triangular spaces bounded on either side by adjoining arches and 
by the dome above. You would be forgiven for seeing them as the starting point from which 
to understand the surrounding architecture. To do so would, however, be a mistake. It is a 
similar mistaken inference that evolutionary biologists have been accused of making in 
assuming a special adaptive purpose for such biological features as fingerprints and chins. I 
argue that a mistake of just this sort is being made by ethicists who appeal to the intrinsic 
value of supererogatory acts in their efforts to make space for supererogation in ethical 
theory. Many cases of supererogatory action are simply spandrels: by-products of 
uncontroversial commitments elsewhere in our moral thought. This is not to downplay 
their value but rather to show that their value need not be the justification for making 
room for the supererogatory. I demonstrate this by examining two areas: rights and the 
distribution of burdens among a group. My argument has significance for those who take 
themselves to be defends of the possibility of supererogatory actions, as well as those who 
are committed to the contrary and those who believe themselves to be indifferent on the 
matter. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. From Architecture, to Biology, to Ethics 
Standing in San Marco Cathedral in Venice, you immediately notice the 
exquisitely decorated spandrels: the triangular spaces bounded on either side 
by adjoining arches and by the dome above. The spectacular ceiling designs 
are so perfectly fitted to the tapering spaces of the spandrels that you might, 
understandably, be tempted to see those spandrels as the starting place from 
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which to understand the surrounding architecture. This would, of course, be a 
mistake. The spandrels are simply architectural by-products of having the 
dome of San Marco mounted on arches. Given the arches, the spaces must 
exist, and since they exist, they are often decorated in extraordinary aesthetic 
style. To argue that the spaces exist because of the ceiling designs is to invert 
the correct explanation. It would be to suppose, as Dr Pangloss does, that 
“everything is made for the best purpose. Our noses were made to carry 
spectacles, so we have spectacles. Legs were clearly intended for breeches, and 
we wear them.”1 
 Those evolutionary biologists who were part of the so-called 
‘Adaptationist Programme’ have been accused by Stephen Jay Gould and 
Richard Charles Lewontin of making the same mistake: of seeking to explain 
the origins of all biological features in terms of their use and value, thereby 
overlooking the architectural constraints placed on evolutionary mechanisms. 
The mistake is Panglossian: the biologists supposed that the causal and 
historical origins of a biological feature could be read off from its current 
utility.2 In so doing, they ignored the possibility that some biological features, 
such as fingerprints3 or the divaricate pattern of molluscs4, could be 
‘evolutionary spandrels’: structural by-products of other features or 
mechanisms. The human chin is another example. Humans bear greater 
resemblance to young apes than to adult apes. The exception to this ‘neotenic’ 
progression is the chin, which is larger in humans than in both infant and 
adult apes. It is tempting therefore to see the human chin as having a specific 
evolutionary function and several, ultimately unsuccessful, attempts were 
made to give such an explanation. However, as Lewontin states “Finally it was 
realised that in an evolutionary sense the chin does not exist!”5 The chin is, in 
fact, a spandrel: it appears simply as a by-product of the relative regression 
rates of two growth fields in the lower jaw (the dentary and alveolar), both of 
which show neoteny. Of course, like the spandrels of San Marco, many of 
these biological features are now considered to be independently valuable; but 
that does not mean that they were directly selected for. 
 
1 Quoted in Gould and Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,” 583, from Voltaire’s Candide. 
2 Gould, “The Exaptive Excellence of Spandrels as a Term and Prototype,” 10750. 
3 Gould and Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A 
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,” 596–7. 
4 Ibid., 595. Gould also gives the examples of the “masculinized genitalia in female hyenas, 
exaptive use of an umbilicus as a brooding chamber by snails, the shoulder hump of the giant 
Irish deer, and several key features of human mentality” (“The Exaptive Excellence of 
Spandrels as a Term and Prototype,” 10750). 
5 Lewontin, “Adaptation,” 217. See also Gould, Ontology and Phylogeny, 381–382. 
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 Just as this architectural metaphor has been important for evolutionary 
biologists, I argue in this paper it is also instructive for ethicists, as a mistake of 
just this nature is being made in debates surrounding supererogatory actions. 
Supererogatory actions are ones that go beyond the call of duty: they are 
neither morally required nor morally forbidden while being better than the 
least we could permissibly have done. We undoubtedly place value on the 
performance of such actions. It is therefore tempting to see this value as 
justifying the limits placed on what we consider to be our duty, limits that are 
necessary in order for room to be made for the possibility of supererogatory 
action. However, like the ceiling designs of San Marco and our chins, another 
explanation can be given. I argue that the space that supererogatory actions 
occupy in our ethical theories should be seen as a moral spandrel: a necessary 
by-product of commitments in other areas of ethical thought. 
 Thus, the argument I give in this paper is a methodological one. It 
addresses the way in which the very possibility of supererogatory action is 
defended. As I will show, one of the main arguments defended in the literature 
is an argument that the value of the optionality of the supererogatory justifies 
limiting duty in order to make room for supererogatory actions. My strategy is 
different: I argue that instead we should look at commitments many already 
make in their ethical theories and see how the possibility of supererogatory 
actions arise as a by-product of these commitments.6 
 Thus, my argument is of significance for three groups. Primarily, it is 
important for those who want to offer a defence of the supererogatory, by 
pointing them towards a different strategy, one that does not rely on a prior 
commitment to the special value of the supererogatory and recognises that the 
reasons that we have to place limits on duty may well be heterogeneous. 
Importantly, identifying these supererogatory acts as spandrels does nothing 
to diminish their value or importance; rather I demonstrate that this value 
need not be appealed to in order to establish the possibility of such acts. 
Secondly, it is important for those who take themselves to be opposed to this 
class of moral actions, as I demonstrate that there is much more at stake in 
rejecting the supererogatory than previously thought. Finally, my argument 
has implications for those who take themselves not to be committed on the 
 
6 Some others have suggested that space for the supererogatory can be derived from other 
aspects of our moral schemata. However, these have mainly focused on thin ethical concepts, 
such as reflecting on the notion of ‘requirement’ (Chisholm, “The Ethics of Requirement.”), 
intrinsic preferability relations (Chisholm and Sosa, “Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of 
Supererogation.”), or integrated conceptual frameworks for our deontic and aretaic notions 
(McNamara, “Making Room for Going Beyond the Call”; Mellema, Beyond the Call of Duty.). 
My approach differs from these by examining specific thick ethical commitments to certain 
types of actions (such as rights and distribution of burdens), bringing them together as 
heterogeneous paths to the same end: the defence of supererogation. 
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question of the existence of supererogatory acts because I demonstrate that 
anyone who makes the commitments I discuss already makes room for the 
possibility of the supererogatory. 
 I begin by defining the core of the concept of supererogation that I will 
be employing. I then discuss an argument for the supererogatory that is 
predominant in the literature and which relies on an appeal to the intrinsic 
value of supererogatory. I then give two examples of where supererogatory 
actions arise as spandrels from other ethical commitments that many already 
make: rights and the distribution of burdens among members of a group. 
Commitments in these areas that I discuss make room for two important 
categories of supererogatory action: supererogatory forbearances and 
volunteering, respectively. I conclude by outlining the advantages of 
considering supererogatory actions as spandrels, which include avoiding some 
of the worries that defenders of supererogation have had about approaches 
that do not appeal to the intrinsic value of the supererogatory. 
 
1.2. Supererogation and Its Paradox 
Supererogatory actions have been defined in many ways. However, at the 
heart of every account are the following two core features: (1) that 
supererogatory actions are neither morally required nor morally forbidden, 
and are thus morally optional; and (2) that supererogatory actions are morally 
good.7 These two features are in tension with many moral theories, giving rise 
to what is often called the ‘paradox of supererogation.’  This paradox is, 
roughly, if an action is morally good—indeed often morally best—why are we 
not required to perform them?8 
 
7 Or, more specifically, they are morally better than some other act that could permissibly 
have been performed instead. The notion of ‘goodness’ that is relevant for defining 
supererogatory action is difficult and controversial to cash out. I agree with McNamara that a 
supererogatory action must be better than the least we could permissibly have done (for more 
on this see McNamara, “Supererogation, inside and out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for 
Common-Sense Morality.”). The examples I propose in this paper are compatible with this 
‘better than the least’ characterisation, as well as with more complex understandings of the 
goodness of supererogatory acts. 
8 For further discussion of this issue, see Raz, “Permissions and Supererogation”; Horgan 
and Timmons, “Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the ‘Paradox’ of 
Supererogation”; Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory; Kagan, “Does 
Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation”; Nagel, 
“The Limits of Objectivity.” 
 Note that there are other features that people have thought necessary for an action to 
be supererogatory, such as: praiseworthiness (for example, Urmson, “Saints and Heroes”; Raz, 
“Permissions and Supererogation.”); meritorious motivation (for example, Horgan and 
Timmons, “Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the ‘Paradox’ of 
Supererogation”; Feinberg, “Supererogation and Rules.”); altruistic or valuable intent (for 
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 One response to the paradox of supererogation question is simply to 
accept that if an action really is good then we are required to perform it and to 
reject the possibility of supererogatory action. However, this response is only 
tempting on the presupposition of a deontic scheme whereby all actions are 
either morally required, morally forbidden or morally indifferent. Following 
McNamara, I call this position the Strong Threefold Classification.9 
 The Strong Threefold Classification is perhaps a familiar one. Simple 
(maximising) act consequentialism entails it because that theory entails that 
all morally significant actions (that is all actions that are not morally 
indifferent) are either morally required (if they maximise the good) or morally 
forbidden (if they do not maximise the good). It is true that on some accounts 
of consequentialism room more than one action could be tied for ‘morally 
best’. These actions would then be optional in the sense that we are neither 
morally required to perform nor forbidden from performing any particular 
act. However, this still does not allow some optional actions to be better than 
others, which is required for supererogatory actions to be possible. It is 
precisely because none are better than any of the others that they are tied. 
Thus, there can be no supererogatory actions on such a view.10 
 What would it take to reject the Strong Threefold Classification? 
Michael Clark claims that any adequate theory of supererogatory action needs 
to answer two questions: the first is “what gives a man the moral right to 
refrain from” performing what is morally good; and the second is “why it is 
 
example, Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory; Archer, “Supererogation and 
Intentions of the Agent.” respectively); self-sacrifice (for example, Jackson, “The Nature of 
Supererogation”; Pybus, “Saints and Heroes”; McGoldrick, “Saints and Heroes: A Plea for the 
Supererogatory.”); and so on. I leave them aside here and give only a very minimal account of 
the supererogatory. This is because the tension that gives rise to the paradox of supererogation 
arises from the two features of being optional and morally better. Once it is demonstrated that 
there are optional, better acts, there is no barrier to claiming that there are optional, better and 
meritorious acts or optional, better and altruistically intended acts and so on. 
9 McNamara, “Making Room for Going Beyond the Call.” A classic articulation of this 
position can be found in Urmson, where he calls it the ‘threefold classification’ (Urmson, 
“Saints and Heroes,” 60). Horgan and Timmons refer to it as the ‘tripartite deontic scheme’ 
(Horgan and Timmons, “Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the ‘Paradox’ of 
Supererogation,” 29.). I prefer McNamara’s terminology as he clearly distinguishes it from 
another threefold classification—‘The Traditional Threefold Classification’—whereby all acts 
are required, forbidden or optional. This latter view allows for the possibility of the 
supererogatory, while the Strong Threefold Classification does not as it assumes that an action 
is optional only insofar as it is morally indifferent, and supererogatory actions are by definition 
not morally indifferent. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging greater clarity 
on this point. 
10 For a comprehensive review of the problems of making room for the possibility of 
supererogation on the main ethical theories of Virtue Ethics, Kantianism, Utilitarianism and 
Contract Theory, see Part I of Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. 
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none the less virtuous to perform those acts.”11 This relates to Heyd’s positive 
and negative justification of supererogation: the latter concerns the 
justification of placing restrictions on the scope of duty, while the former 
concerns the value that supererogatory actions possess.12 
 While these two questions are conceptually distinct, nevertheless, by 
answering the second question—by providing an account of the value of the 
supererogatory—the first question can be answered—of why we should allow 
space for the supererogatory. I will call this the ‘Intrinsic Value Argument’ for 
supererogation.13 This move—from the value that supererogatory actions might 
have to a reason to make room for the possibility of supererogatory actions on 
an ethical theory—is the Panglossian mistake that I address in this paper and 
provide an alternative to. I turn now to considering this argument in more 
detail. 
 
1.3. The Intrinsic Value Argument 
Heyd asks us to imagine “a world in which all morally good acts are also 
obligatory and in which individuals are capable of carrying out their duties 
with ease (and with no conflict with their personal goals and aims). Is 
something of moral value missing in such a world?”14 It is the thought that 
‘yes, something is missing’ that gives rise to the Intrinsic Value Argument. 
That this is a common thought can be seen from the fact that the adequacy of 
a moral theory is often taken to be dependent on its treatment of 
supererogation.15 
 Note, however, that there is an ambiguity in the idea that 
supererogatory actions are valuable. On the one hand, supererogatory are 
morally good (in fact, better than other permissible acts) and this does provide 
a source of moral value. They might even be the action that is morally best to 
do. However, this is not the sort of value that can provide the justification of 
why we should allow room for the supererogatory on an ethical theory, 
because obligatory actions can also be morally good (we can even imagine 
cases where what is obligatory is what is morally best). If we imagine a world 
without the supererogatory, as Heyd asks us to do, we do not imagine a world 
without morally good acts. Thus, in order for the value of the supererogatory 
to be an argument for limiting duty, it must necessarily be a value that the 
supererogatory does not share with the obligatory. This value must, therefore, 
 
11 Clark, “The Meritorious and the Mandatory,” 29. 
12 Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, 166.  
13 I take this term from Kagan’s discussion of this argument in Heyd (Kagan, “Does 
Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation,” 243.). 
14 Heyd, “Supererogation.” 
15 Baron, “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,” 238. 
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lie in the optional nature of supererogatory actions as this value is something 
that would not be captured on a theory where every act of moral significance 
was morally required or forbidden. If the Intrinsic Value Argument manages 
to provide an account of the intrinsic value of the optionality of 
supererogatory acts it would give us “a reason to reject a general requirement 
to promote the good.”16 
 The Intrinsic Value Argument must therefore invoke the value of 
optionality. What exactly the value of optionality is could be spelt out in many 
ways. However, there is a theme amongst theorists who make the Intrinsic 
Value Argument: the value of optional actions lies in autonomy.17 I briefly 
outline four theorists who make this argument. 
 Heyd explicitly states that autonomy provides the basis for both the 
negative and positive justification of supererogation (and thus answers both of 
Clark’s questions): autonomy grounds the value of the supererogatory, which 
in turn justifies the placing of limits on what can be required of us.18 The 
positive value of supererogation can be seen by “pointing out the freedom of 
the individual involved in purely optional choice.”19 
 Clark too argues that autonomy—“the value of freedom to control and 
plan one’s life and to choose the style in which one lives”—provides the answer 
to why we ought to make room for the supererogatory.20 This is also why 
supererogatory acts are valuable: the virtue of a supererogatory act comes 
from it being “a personal sacrifice calculated to benefit others, a sacrifice 
freely made by an agent not morally required to make it.”21 Of course, many 
morally obligatory actions involve sacrifice and benefit others. That is why, as 
Dancy says in his discussion of Clark’s argument, “It is the optionality that is 
crucial.”22 Thus, Clark’s argument shares a central claim with Heyd’s: that, as 
Dancy puts it, a supererogatory action “acquires value from its being optional 
for the agent.”23 
 
16 Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of 
Obligation,” 243. 
17 There is a question about whether the value of optionality and the value of autonomy are 
distinct. As Dancy says, we can understand an optional action as “one that forms part of an 
agent’s personal projects, as opposed to his contribution to the general climate of social 
cooperation” (Dancy, “Supererogation and Moral Realism,” 183.). If so then “there is no real 
gap between optionality and the exercise of autonomy” (Ibid.) and thus there would be no real 
gap between the value of optionality and the value of autonomy. However, we can imagine 
ways in which they come apart. 
18 Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, 172 and 177. 
19 Ibid., 166. 
20 Clark, “The Meritorious and the Mandatory,” 29. 
21 Ibid., 30. 
22 Dancy, “Supererogation and Moral Realism,” 183. 
23 Ibid. 
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 Both Joseph Raz and Michael Ferry also argue that the class of 
supererogatory should be made room for on an ethical theory because 
optionality is valuable from the point of view of autonomy. Raz claims the 
value of the autonomy “includes the value of persons forming plans and ideals 
according to which they will conduct their life.”24 He emphasises the conflict, 
as do the other authors mentioned here, between our plans and projects—and 
thus our autonomy—and the demands to promote the welfare of others. Ferry 
also appeals to the importance of our plans and projects: “If we were 
accountable for doing our very best, then few of our decisions would be 
protected from morality’s demands, and our freedom to pursue personal 
projects would be undermined.”25 
 However, there are deep problems with these arguments that derive the 
value and justification of supererogation from the value of autonomy. These 
include concerns about the value of autonomy itself; whether this value 
actually explains the value of the optional or is simply a restatement of the 
author’s commitment to that latter value; and whether arguing for the value of 
the class of the supererogatory before the possibility of such actions has been 
established seems to have gotten the cart before the horse. 
 At the heart of these worries is, I believe, a concern over the role that 
value is playing in arguments for the supererogatory. Dancy, for example, 
argues “The fact, if it is a fact, that supererogatory actions are optional may 
perhaps add to their value. But it does not contribute to the explanation of 
why they are not duties […], and whatever value is added by optionality is 
surely insufficient to justify the high place we assign to the supererogatory.”26 
There are reasons to doubt that there really is an “entirely distinctive form of 
value” that is restricted to the supererogatory.27 Shelly Kagan too has 
expressed doubts about Heyd’s argument from autonomy and the Intrinsic 
Value Argument in general.28 This looks like it is quite a blow for 
supererogationists. However, in this paper, I provide an alternative strategy to 
reject the Strong Threefold Classification. 
 
 
 
 
24 Raz, “Permissions and Supererogation,” 167. 
25 Ferry, “Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of 
Duty,” 15. 
26 Dancy, “Supererogation and Moral Realism,” 185. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of 
Obligation.” 
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1.4. Supererogatory Spandrels 
By starting from the point of view that supererogatory actions are 
intrinsically valuable, theorists paint a Panglossian picture of supererogation: 
inferring from the value of the class of the supererogatory that it ought to be 
included on our ethical theories because of that value. Gould and Lewontin 
recommended that the evolutionary biologists entertain the possibility that 
some phenotypic characteristics are spandrels. I recommend a similar strategy 
in the case of supererogation. We should see some cases of supererogatory 
actions as moral spandrels: structural by-products of moral commitments 
many already make regardless of any particular commitment to the value of 
supererogatory actions. This is not to deny that they are valuable. Of course, 
given the possibility of supererogatory actions, it is likely that particular 
significance will then be placed upon their performance. However, the value of 
the supererogatory, just like the ceiling designs at San Marco, should not lead 
us to think that the only justification for this class of moral action is their 
value. 
 I discuss commitments in the following two areas: first, rights and 
second, the distribution of burdens among a group. There may be other areas 
than the two identified here that give rise to supererogatory spandrels. 
Nevertheless, these commitments, with their implications for supererogation, 
are enough to establish space for the supererogatory. 
 
2. RIGHTS AND SUPEREROGATORY FORBEARANCES 
2.1. Rights and Paired Rights 
In addition to legal rights, many ethicists are also committed to the 
existence to moral (or natural) rights. The particular rights that are of interest 
are those according to which I am both entitled to do something and also 
entitled not to do it. The routine commitments made by many to rights of this 
sort entail the existence of optional acts, which can, in some circumstances, be 
better than permissible alternatives. I begin therefore by looking more closely 
at this type of rights. 
 Suppose I have the right to do φ. In this context, φ can refer either to 
an action or to the creation or annulment of other rights and duties.29 For 
 
29 On a Hohfelidan analysis, the former constitutes a privilege-right while the latter is a 
power-right, which involves the ability within a set of rules to create, waive or annul privilege 
and claim rights (Wenar, “The Nature of Rights,” 231). No commitment to a Hohfeldian 
analysis is needed for my purposes here and it is important to note that Hohfeld’s discussion is 
of legal rights, rather than moral rights. I mention it only to situate it in the Hohfeldian-laden 
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example, I have a right to drink this cup of coffee that I purchased. I also have 
the right to promise to read over your work, which creates a claim on your 
behalf and a duty for me: to do what I have promised. 
 What is of interest is not just having a right but having a paired right: a 
right to φ and a right not to φ. Take a judge who lacks judicial discretion. 
When faced with a criminal and a verdict of guilty, there is a sentence she is 
required to give. She therefore has the right to sentence the criminal in 
accordance with the law but no right not to: thus, while she has a right, she 
doesn’t have a paired right. However, this is not true of most rights. Often we 
have a choice as to whether or not to act on the right that we have. I have the 
right to drink my coffee and a right not to if I so choose. I have the right that a 
debtor pay me but I also have the right to waive the debt. 
 
2.2. Rights and Optionality 
Let us suppose that a paired right exists with respect to some action φ. We 
therefore have no duty to φ and no duty not to φ.30 Therefore, we are neither 
required to φ nor forbidden from φ-ing. Thus, on such occasions, φ-ing will be 
optional. 
So far, so boring. We can come by the existence of optional actions, it might 
be thought, much more easily than this. We do not need to appeal to rights in 
particular.31 Without any particular commitment to rights, we might think that 
 
discourse on rights and because his system of classification of different types of rights is useful. 
For further discussion of Hohfeldian incidents, see Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.” and Wenar, “The Nature of Rights.”  
30 Some might think that it isn’t so straightforward that I have no obligation to something in 
virtue of having a right to do so. For example, some might agree with the ACLU’s defense of 
the right of neo-Nazi’s to march in Skokie, Illinois, while doubting that it was not morally 
wrong to march. Note, however, that this does not amount to a challenge to my argument here 
if the right to march is legal rather than moral or if it is thought that they have a right that it 
would be morally bad (rather than impermissible) for them to exercise. Furthermore, under the 
uncontroversial assumption that not all rights are of this form, my argument still holds that on 
any plausible account of rights, room for the supererogatory is made. 
31 Thought it is interesting to note that many authors on supererogation talk of agents being 
‘within their rights’ to refuse to perform a supererogatory act (for example, Chisholm, “The 
Ethics of Requirement,” 152; Driver, “The Suberogatory,” 288; Dancy, Moral Reasons, 139; 
Clark, “The Meritorious and the Mandatory,” 29–31.). There is also a long history of 
discussions of supererogation and agent-centred prerogatives (see, for example, McNamara, 
“Supererogation, inside and out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common-Sense Morality”; 
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism.). These prerogatives give an agent permission to 
do less than what is best. The existence of agent-centred prerogatives allows for supererogatory 
action. Moral rights are a form of agent-centred prerogatives. My discussion of rights is 
nevertheless fruitful because it makes clear that commitments to the existence to rights can 
come prior to any commitment to the supererogatory. The main justifications of rights (and 
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certain actions, such as wearing this pair of socks rather than that pair, are 
optional. However, my argument goes beyond this. Choosing to wear this pair 
of socks rather than that pair is discretionary. I am allowed to use my 
discretion to decide which pair to wear. However, this is precisely because 
these are not morally significant actions. To reject the Strong Threefold 
Classification, it must be shown that morally significant actions can be 
optional. This is possible to do by appeal to rights, as, by their nature, rights 
are frequently rights over—or rights to—things of great moral significance. 
This can be seen from the fact that many acts that involve the exercise (or 
waiving) of a paired right will be morally better than the least we could 
permissibly have done, on a variety of understandings of ‘morally better’. I 
have a right to waive the debt that you owe me; I also have the right not to 
waive it. Often it will be morally better if I choose to waive it, as it will 
transform the loan into an act of munificence, freeing you from having to 
repay me. It is easy to see that in many cases exercising our rights (or choosing 
to refrain from doing so) will be morally better than not.32 
Anyone who accepts the existence of paired rights on any plausible account 
of rights therefore also accepts the possibility of supererogatory actions. Those 
who wish to deny the possibility of supererogatory actions must deny the 
existence of paired rights. While this is a possibility, it is a high price to pay. 
 
2.3. Rights and the Strong Threefold Classification 
It might be thought that I have been too hasty here. My argument for the 
possibility of supererogatory actions—actions that are good and optional—
presupposes that establishing that an action is optional and establishing that it 
is good are separate issues. It might be argued, however, that we do not know 
if an action is optional or not until we have determined whether it is good. For 
example, by recognising the goodness of helping others in severe distress at 
little cost to ourselves, we might realise that our immunity from others 
creating claims against us is not as substantial as we perhaps thought. This in 
turn (so the argument goes) informs us about our rights. If this is the case, 
then I have put the cart before the horse in arguing for the possibility of 
optional actions before discussing the good done by performing the acts in 
question. 
 
thus of a certain type of agent-centred prerogative) allow for supererogatory actions, without 
relying on the value of supererogatory actions. 
32 That is not to say, of course, that on every occasion any exercise of my right (or waiving of 
my right) will be morally better. To establish the possibility of supererogatory action, it is 
enough to show that the exercise of a right (or the waiving of that right) is at least sometimes 
morally better. 
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 There are two types of rights that would not entail the possibility of 
supererogation. The first are those rights that we have a duty to (or not to) 
exercise (such as the judge who lacked judiciary discretion); the second are 
those rights that we possess only because they concern things of no moral 
importance (such as choosing between this or that pair of identical socks). 
However, no plausible account restricts rights to these two types. A debt would 
cease to be a debt at all if the person to whom the debt is owed has no 
immunity from the debt being annulled whenever it would be good if it was. 
In fact, neither of the two main accounts of rights—the Will Theory and the 
Interest Theory—restrict the rights that they defend to those that we have a 
duty to exercise (or to refrain from exercising) or to those regarding actions 
that are not morally significant. A commitment to either of these, therefore, is 
a commitment to the possibility of supererogation action. 
 
2.4. Supererogatory Forbearances 
A further concern might be that, while these commitments entail the 
possibility of supererogatory action, they only entail the possibility of some 
strange or unimportant cases of such acts. However, the rights discussed above 
in fact establish the possibility of some central types of supererogatory action, 
namely supererogatory forbearances, and also pardon, forgiveness, and mercy, 
which are a species of supererogatory forbearances. 
Heyd describes an act of forbearance as supererogatory “when a person 
does not do something which he is morally entitled to do, like demanding less 
than his due, or not insisting on his rights (granting ‘a period of grace’).”33 
There are times when we have a claim against another: that they, for example, 
pay us what is owed. There are at least some occasions when we have a paired 
right over these claims such that we can either insist on them or, instead, waive 
or attenuate them by, for example, reducing or annulling the debt. These 
paired rights therefore make room for the supererogatory forbearance of not 
demanding the debt be repaid even though we are entitled to. 
We can see this in the case of mercy (the same claims apply in the case of 
forgiveness and pardon). What is of interest here is what Heyd calls ‘non-
corrective’ mercy (rather than mercy used to correct an undeserved 
punishment meted out by unjust legal system).34 Non-corrective mercy cannot 
be a moral duty because the presumption is that the full punishment is 
entirely just, and therefore it is not the case that we are morally required to 
refrain from imposing the just punishment. Although it might be the case that 
the person deserves (in the sense of ‘is worthy of’) mercy, this does not mean 
 
33 Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, 152. Original emphasis. 
34 Ibid., 156. 
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that they are entitled to it.35 Nevertheless, although we have the right to see 
that the just permission is meted out, we can also have the right to attenuate or 
(in some circumstances) withdraw the punishment, for example if we are a 
judge with the procedural authority to do so. Thus, it follows that these 
actions—forbearances, mercy, pardon, and forgiveness—can be shown to be 
supererogatory without appealing to the intrinsic value such actions have in 
virtue of their optionality. 
A commitment to paired rights as described here entails a commitment to 
the possibility of supererogatory acts. My strategy of identifying 
supererogatory spandrels is not, however, limited to rights. There is another 
area where this strategy can be implemented: the distribution of burdens 
among a group. 
 
3. VOLUNTEERING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF BURDENS AMONG 
A GROUP 
3.1. Proportional Distribution of Costs 
Sometimes it is not possible to distribute the costs of achieving a group aim 
among the members of a group in a way that is ‘proportional’. By a lack of 
proportional distribution I mean that, if it were possible, the costs of achieving 
the aim of a group would be spread among the members of that group, but for 
some reason it is not possible to distribute the costs in that way.36 Suppose 
someone needs a kidney and any of his four sisters could donate one (they are 
all matches and so on). A proportional distribution of costs would, perhaps, 
mean donating a quarter of a kidney and thus only taking on a quarter of the 
cost of doing so—but this cannot be done. To achieve their collective aim of 
saving their brother, one and only one of them, must donate. 
 
3.2. Where there is No Identifiable Duty-Holder 
In cases where the costs cannot be distributed, it is arguably optional for 
any particular member of the group to take the costs upon themselves. In the 
case of the kidney donation, it is plausible to think that no particular sister can 
 
35 Ibid., 160. 
36 Now there may be circumstances in which although a particular cost cannot be 
distributed, the overall cost can be. For example, suppose only one out of a set of siblings can 
have their infirm mother live with them; however, while that specific cost cannot be 
distributed, the other siblings could still contribute, say, to the cost of her care. All I want to 
commit to here is that there are at least some cases where the overall costs cannot be 
distributed proportionately. For simplicity, I restrict my discussion to cases where the costs 
cannot be distributed at all, such as in the case of kidney donation. 
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be morally required to give a kidney. It cannot be the case that all the sisters 
are required to give their kidneys, since only one is needed. Nevertheless, as all 
the sisters are equally placed to donate, no one particular sister can be singled 
out such that she is the one required to give her kidney. In this case, there 
would be no identifiable duty-holder. This means that if any one of the sisters 
were to donate her kidney, this would be optional. Not only would it be 
optional, it would be morally better than not doing so. It would save the life of 
her brother and save her sisters from taking on this cost.37 So, the possibility of 
a morally optional act that is better than a permissible alternative—the basis of 
the supererogatory—arises as a spandrel, simply a by-product of accepting that 
a lack of proportional distribution of costs leads to being unable to identify a 
duty holder. 
 
3.3. Where there is an Identifiable Duty-Holder 
The above discussion, however, is based on the assumption that in some 
cases it is impossible to achieve a proportional distribution. There are two 
possible objections to this assumption. Firstly, some might argue that the 
member of a group who would be the least disadvantaged by bearing the costs 
(even when these costs cannot be distributed among the other members) is 
required to do so. Thus, a duty-holder is identified. For this person, it would 
not be optional to bear the costs. Secondly, it might be proposed that all the 
members of a group have a conditional obligation to undertake the costs if, for 
example, they are chosen to do so by a fair procedure or chosen at random. 
On the face of it, these proposals look like serious problems because they 
assert the existence of a moral requirement. However, both can be addressed 
in the same way. Let us return to the case of kidney donation. The first 
proposal is that the sister least inconvenienced by doing so is morally required 
to donate her kidney. The second is that the sister selected by fair (or random) 
procedure is required to donate. This alone doesn’t rule out the possibility of 
supererogatory acts. To rule out this possibility, given that supererogatory 
actions are neither morally required, nor morally forbidden, nor morally bad, 
it would have to be argued that it is (i) morally obligatory, (ii) morally 
impermissible or (iii) morally bad for another member of the group to offer to 
undertake the costs (in this case, offer their own kidney) in place of the person 
who is picked out as morally required. 
It does not make sense to think that the sister is morally obligated to 
volunteer in this case, as that is just to say that they are morally obligated to 
 
37 Note that it is not just that the group has achieved something morally good, but that the 
sister who undertakes the cost has done something morally good that cannot be attributed to 
the other sisters. 
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donate their kidney, and it has already been stipulated that another sister has 
been selected as the person obligated to do so. It is equally implausible to 
think that it is always morally impermissible. While some may doubt the claim 
that no particular member is required to take the costs upon themselves when 
the costs cannot be proportionately distributed, it is hard to doubt that other 
members can at least sometimes permissibly offer to take the costs upon 
themselves. This is significant because a commitment to the permissibility of 
someone making such an offer in place of the person who is required entails a 
commitment to optional actions. It would be permissible and not required to 
offer in this way, as either the person doing the offering would be more 
disadvantaged by doing so than the person to whom the moral requirement 
applies, or because, in the other scenario, their conditional obligation is 
fulfilled because someone else was selected by fair procedure. Offering to take 
the cost would therefore be optional. 
It is similarly implausible to think that such an offer would always be 
morally bad.38 Just as in the case where it was supposed that there was no 
identifiable duty-holder, it would still usually be morally better to offer than 
not, given that it would save the life of another and would save someone else 
from bearing the costs. It might not be best but it would be good.39 Thus, the 
possibility of a supererogatory act arises simply as a by-product to 
commitments concerning the permissibility of offering to undertake costs even 
when it is the responsibility of another to do so. 
 
3.4. Volunteering 
The supererogatory spandrels that emerge as by-products of the 
commitments outlined—those that arise from a lack of proportional 
distribution of burdens among a group—establish a very important class of 
supererogatory actions: volunteering. As Heyd says, “in its wider general 
meaning (‘undertaking a service of one’s own free will’ according to the 
O.E.D.) [volunteering] virtually characterises any supererogatory action.”40 
More specifically, volunteering involves “the offering of one’s services (help, 
etc.) to do something which is collectively required of a group” where the task 
“does not allow for the [proportional] distribution of the burden among the 
 
38 In some circumstances, an offer to donate may well be bad, and even so bad as to be 
impermissible. However, so long as this is not the case on every occasion, room for 
supererogation is made. 
39 It is compatible on my account to regard the supererogatory act as the act of volunteering 
rather than the act of donating. I take both to be (on the examples described here) both 
optional and morally good. 
40 Ibid., 150. 
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members.”41 Whenever a burden cannot be distributed proportionally among 
members of a group, it is an act of supererogatory volunteering for someone to 
(offer to) undertake that burden when they have no obligation to do so (either 
because no member of the group is obliged or because they are offering to 
undertake the burden in the place of the person who is obliged) and when it is 
morally better than the least they could permissible do. The supererogatory 
spandrels that arise from these commitments concerning the distribution of 
burdens among a group are cases of supererogatory volunteering, a central 
type of supererogatory action. Thus, just as in the case of rights, room is made 
for this class of moral action without reference to the intrinsic value that the 
supererogatory has in virtue of its optionality. 
 
4. THE IDENTIFICATION OF SPANDRELS AS A STRATEGY 
One central approach to answering the paradox of supererogation is to 
appeal to the intrinsic value of the class of supererogatory action. I have 
demonstrated that the paradox can be answered in a different way, by giving 
two examples of areas in which supererogatory acts arise as spandrels. These 
have established some important categories of supererogatory actions: 
supererogatory forbearance, forgiveness, pardon, mercy and volunteering. 
While I have not in this paper defended the claim that all types of 
supererogatory actions can be explained as spandrels42, it may well turn out 
that they can be.43 
 
4.1. Defending Supererogationism 
An advantage of my account is that, while I avoid the unnecessary appeal to 
the intrinsic value of optionality, I also give an account that allows for a full 
defence of the supererogatory against the paradox of supererogation, avoiding 
what Heyd calls qualified supererogationism (in contrast to unqualified 
 
41 Ibid. Original emphasis. 
42 For example, in addition to the categories mentioned here, Heyd includes in his taxonomy 
of supererogatory actions saintliness and heroism, beneficence (including charity, generosity, 
and gifts) and favours (Ibid., 142–150.). 
43 For example, Murphy accounts for supererogatory beneficence through a commitment to 
the limit of the demands that can be placed on us being determined in the ideal world, rather 
than the non-ideal world (Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory.). Alternatively, there 
is a suggestion in Calhoun on decency that small acts (such as favours and kindnesses) are 
supererogatory actions (rather than simply the decent thing to do) in situation where the acts 
are not clearly or unambiguously good to do (Calhoun, “Common Decency,” 8.).  
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supererogationism)44 and what Dancy calls weak supererogationism (in 
contrast to strong supererogationism)45 whereby supererogatory actions are not 
fully optional but are, rather, reduced to a form of duty. For simplicity I use 
Dancy’s terms in this paper. 
 There are three main concerns about any account that defends a weak 
supererogationism. I articulate these worries and then show how my argument 
for considering some supererogatory actions to be spandrels avoids all these 
worries and can thus be seen as a strong supererogationist position. 
 Firstly, there is the worry that, while qualified supererogationist 
accounts recognise the category of supererogatory acts, they only do so by 
seeing these acts as duties that are, for example, imperfect or unenforceable. 
Heyd claims that we should reject these views of supererogation because, he 
believes, supererogatory actions go beyond duty rather than being reducible to 
imperfect or unenforceable duties. 
 Secondly, according to weak supererogationism, acts are only 
supererogatory because we have some sort of excuse or exemption for failing 
to perform them. Weak supererogationism “sees the supererogatory act not as 
an act that is not our duty despite its value, but as an act that, despite being 
our duty, or at least being one we ought to do, is one whose non-performance 
does not attract sanction, disapproval, or penalty. The weak supererogationist 
hold that we ought to do these actions because of their value, but that nobody 
is going to blame us if we don’t […].”46 Heyd claims that we should resist this 
idea because it is part of the nature of supererogatory acts that we do not need 
an excuse to fail to perform them. 
 Thirdly, there is the concern that, as weak supererogationists play down 
“the positive moral value of supererogation”, they thereby relegate it “to the 
morally neutral category of the ‘permitted’.”47 This is problematic, Heyd 
argues, because such views “run the risk of losing sight of what makes 
supererogatory action uniquely meritorious and praiseworthy.”48 
 Both authors agree that weak supererogationism “is distinctively 
unsatisfactory as a position, since it is naturally implausible.”49 Dancy 
describes it as “one of the positions of which Aristotle would say that nobody 
 
44 The clearest statement of his distinction (which is less clearly expressed in his book) is 
given in his updated Stanford Encyclopaedia entry for ‘Supererogation’. It is from this that I 
tease out his concerns in order to get a more general picture of the distinction he wants to 
draw. This is required as his discussion is predominantly of examples of particular theorists he 
classifies as qualified supererogationists, rather than a sustained attempt to articulate the 
precise difference between qualified and unqualified supererogationism.  
45 Dancy, “Supererogation and Moral Realism”; Dancy, Moral Reasons. 
46 Dancy, “Supererogation and Moral Realism,” 175. 
47 Heyd, “Supererogation.” 
48 Ibid. 
49 Dancy, Moral Reasons, 131. 
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would hold it except as the result of a theory.”50 I agree. It is an advantage of 
my defence of supererogation that is not a form of weak supererogationism. 
 I do not reduce supererogation to a sub-species of duty. The optionality 
of supererogatory acts is generated by other commitments and not because 
they are conceived of as ‘supererogatorily required’ or as a form of ‘imperfect 
duty’. I avoid the second worry as it does not follow from my account that we 
need any sort of excuse or exemption for failing to perform a supererogatory 
act. Furthermore, I do not reject, doubt or overlook the positive moral value of 
the supererogatory. I do not argue that supererogatory acts are merely 
‘permitted’ or ‘morally neutral’, nor do I lose sight of what makes 
supererogatory acts meritorious. Just as beauty of the spandrels of San Marco 
ought not to be downplayed because they are ‘just’ spandrels, my approach of 
identifying supererogatory acts as moral spandrels should not be seen as 
dismissive or downplaying their significance.51 Nothing in my view makes it 
hard to see why supererogatory acts are valuable, important or meritorious. I 
simply claim that we do not need to appeal to these features to explain why 
room ought to be made for the supererogatory.  
 My position is therefore one of a strong supererogationist. Both Heyd 
and Dancy claim that the first defence of strong supererogationism is the 
claim that “it is a good thing that not every action having value should be 
considered as a duty or as an action that ought to be done.”52 This explains the 
trend among defenders of the supererogatory to appeal to the intrinsic value 
of the optionality of supererogatory acts. However, my strategy of justifying 
room for going beyond the call of duty without appealing to the value of the 
supererogatory is no weaker than supererogationist strategies, like Heyd’s, that 
do. 
 
4.2. The Advantages of the Spandrels Approach 
The strategy of identifying supererogatory spandrels has several 
advantages. 
 It provides an important avenue for those supererogationists putting 
forward arguments for the supererogatory and defending it against the 
paradox of supererogation. It does not require arguments for the special value 
of the supererogatory or the optional, which have been demonstrated to be 
problematic and unconvincing. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that, 
instead of trying to find one argument for why our duties ought to be limited, 
perhaps there are several. These heterogeneous routes lead to the same 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to make this clearer. 
52 Dancy, “Supererogation and Moral Realism,” 175–6. 
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conclusion: that supererogatory actions are possible. Thus, I avoid the critique 
that no one argument will explain both heroic and small acts of 
supererogation or (for example) both forgiveness and volunteering. The value 
that we place on supererogatory actions may well have the same source—they 
are morally good for people other than the agent—and yet the reason why 
there is room for such actions may come from a variety of ethical 
commitments.53 
Of course, I have not given a defence here of the commitments discussed 
that give rise to supererogatory actions. Therefore, it might be objected that I 
have failed to give an argument against being, for example, an act 
consequentialist or any other kind of theorist who adamantly rejects the 
supererogatory. Nonetheless, understanding supererogatory acts as spandrels 
gives us greater reason to resist these positions. Other commitments in ethical 
thought stand and fall with supererogation. There is therefore a high price 
that must be paid by those who hold fast to the claim that there are no 
supererogatory actions: they must also be committed to implausible views on 
rights and distributions of burdens among a group. 
 At first glance, this debate between supererogationists and anti-
supererogationists as to the possibility of supererogatory acts seems to be of 
limited concern for ethical theory more generally. The general absence in 
ethical discourse of discussions of supererogation suggests that many ethicists 
believe that the possibility of supererogatory actions has little implication for 
the areas of ethics they are interested in.54 The arguments from the intrinsic 
value of supererogatory actions do little to challenge this view. Those who 
need convincing that room should be made for the supererogatory are those 
who are ambivalent about the possibility of supererogatory acts. Thus, they 
are likely to be ambivalent about the value of such actions. I have 
demonstrated that an argument with broader appeal than the Intrinsic Value 
Argument can be made, one more likely to convince those who think they 
 
53 The considerations presented here do not rule out that some further considerations give 
rise to both the commitments to rights and distribution of burdens discussed here and 
supererogation (my thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this possibility out). 
However, nothing I have said here relies on such further considerations. This has the 
advantage that it allows for a variety of reasons to be committed to, for example, rights, any of 
which will also be reasons to be committed to the possibility of supererogatory action. 
Furthermore, while it is true that some forms of deontology is committed to both rights and 
supererogation, it remains true that often theorists are committed to rights and therefore to 
deontology (over, say, consequentialism) rather than vice versa. I therefore leave aside issues of 
conceptual priority, except to note that significant types of supererogatory actions arise as by-
products of commitments routinely made in other areas of ethics. 
54 I agree with Heyd that “there is a lack of proportion between the importance ascribed to 
acts of supererogation in everyday life and the relative paucity of theoretical analysis of these 
acts in the history of ethics” (Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, 1). 
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hold no firm views on the supererogatory or its value. Many ethicists already 
routinely make commitments in other areas of ethical thought that entail the 
possibility of supererogatory acts. No appeal to the value of supererogatory 
actions is needed. Of course, once we have supererogatory acts, particular 
importance is naturally placed upon them, but their current value need not be 
the explanation for their existence. 
 Thus, even if we accept, as Dr Pangloss does, that this is the best of all 
possible worlds, that is not to say that we have to accept that this is because 
everything is made for the best purposes. We do not have things like rights 
because of the supererogatory; we have the supererogatory because of things 
like rights. 
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